

Abstractions and tooling for leakage evaluation

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SCARV \approx side-channels + RISC-V
 \approx cryptographic engineering + computer architecture


Context



– Hackers (<https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0113243>)

<https://imgur.com/t/hackers/YZMw45k>


- (A) goal: given



consider the role of an ISA in cryptographic engineering tasks, e.g.,

ISEs for primitives	:	[24]
ISEs for masking	:	[17, 22]
micro-architectural leakage	:	[19, 23, 16]
	:	


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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consider the role of an aISA [20] in cryptographic engineering tasks, e.g.,



► Problem:

- we've produced hardware *and* software implementations,
- we need to assess them using some form of leakage evaluation.

► Solution:

- from a +ve perspective:

1. we have hardware infrastructure:

- SASEBO [2, 21]
- ChipWhisperer [3, 25]
- ...

2. we have software infrastructure:

- Jlsca [4]
- SCARED [5]
- ...

3. we have data sets:

- DPA contest [6, 15]
- ASCAD [7, 13]
- ...

Context

► Problem:

- we've produced hardware *and* software implementations,
- we need to assess them using some form of leakage evaluation.

► Solution:

► from a **-ve perspective**:

- for *some* users and use-cases, this tooling isn't ideal, e.g.,


- | | | | |
|----|-----------------|---|-------------------------------------|
| 1. | abstraction | ⇒ | research on “fundamentals”, CI, ... |
| 2. | reproducibility | ⇒ | standards, contests, surveys, ... |
| 3. | productivity | ⇒ | limits on time, space, cost, etc. |

⋮

- so what ideas for alternatives and/or additions could make sense?


Tool #1: SCA3S \approx remote acquisition and analysis

► Concept [8]:




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
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


1. build system:

- esp. with embedded targets, deps. and reproducibility are tricky,
- \therefore containerise tool-chain, HAL, etc. using Docker.

Tool #1: SCA3S \approx remote acquisition and analysis

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


2. I/O protocol:

- there *are* existing (e.g., SimpleSerial), but *no* standard choices,
- want higher level of abstraction, \therefore
 - implementation defines set of registers (with type, plus fixed or variable length content),
 - implementation defines set of kernels,
 - harness provides a mechanism to interact and introspect.

Tool #1: SCA3S \approx remote acquisition and analysis


► Concept:



3. data set format:

- there *are* existing (e.g., TRS), but *no* standard instances,
- \therefore leverage existing technology, namely HDF5.

Tool #1: SCA3S \approx remote acquisition and analysis



Tool #1: SCA3S \simeq remote acquisition and analysis

► Advert:

- the prototype stems from a UG dissertation (James Webb)

<https://github.com/scarv/theses/blob/master/meng/jw15520.pdf>

- there's an umbrella repo. at

<https://github.com/scarv/sca3s>

captures all related components,

- the user-facing repo. is at

<https://github.com/scarv/sca3s-harness>

under which the wiki

<https://github.com/scarv/sca3s-harness/wiki>

documents the workflow,

- the user-facing web interface is live at

<https://sca3s.scarv.org>

Tool #1: SCA3S \approx remote acquisition and analysis

► Outlook:

- what it *can* do:
 - support somewhat plug-and-play equipment: ours supports



\ni

- CW308-based Cortex-M0 + PicoScope 5444b
- CW308-based Cortex-M3 + PicoScope 5444b
- CW305-based RISC-V + PicoScope 5444b
- SASEBO-based RISC-V + PicoScope 5444b
- GILES [9] (a derivative of ELMO [1])
- ...

- but the front- and back-ends are decoupled, so others could co-exist,
- parameterised data set acquisition,
- trigger a TVLA-based analysis of commit into repository,
- ...


Tool #1: SCA3S \simeq remote acquisition and analysis

► Outlook:

- what it *could* do:
 - act as a corpus to study cryptographic implementation,
 - run automated analysis for $X \in \{\text{constant-time'ness, fault attack, } \dots\}$,
 - support artefact evaluation processes,
 - support standardisation processes (cf. [14]),
 - support surveys (cf. [23]),
 - ...


Tool #2: scaflow \approx analysis as data-flow programming

- **Concept:** model computation as a directed graph.



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
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https://wiki.gnuradio.org/index.php?title=File:FunCube_2_meter_NB_FM_fg.png


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
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Tool #2: scaflow \approx analysis as data-flow programming

- **Concept:** model computation as a directed graph.



but *why* ... similar argument to LabVIEW [10], e.g.,

1. high level of abstraction, e.g., emphasising modular workflow,
2. decouple specification from execution of workflow,
3. ...

Tool #2: scaflow \simeq analysis as data-flow programming

► Advert:

- the prototype stems from a UG dissertation (Fergus Longley)

<https://github.com/scarv/theses/blob/master/meng/fl17431.pdf>

- there's an umbrella repo. at

<https://github.com/scarv/scaflow>

captures all related components.

Tool #2: scaflow \simeq analysis as data-flow programming

► Outlook:

- what it *can* do: errr, not a lot
 - manipulation of basic nodes via UI (plus some exploration of “advanced” nodes, e.g., choice),
 - execute workflow using underlying library (e.g., to solve CHES challenge),
 - serialise workflow into JSON,
 - ...

this was very much a PoC only, so a re-write, e.g., using Ryven [11], is important first step.

Tool #2: scaflow \simeq analysis as data-flow programming

► Outlook:

- what it *could* do:
 - enable transparent, intelligent performance decisions (offload, caching, etc.),
 - promote (more) modular, inter-operable analysis “blocks” (e.g., libraries),
 - support artefact evaluation processes,
 - ...

Conclusions

- ▶ A **-ve take**: on one hand,
 - ▶ there's nothing particularly *deep* here,
 - ▶ none of the tools are particularly mature: *lots* of “what if” and “yeah but” questions,
 - ▶ they aren't the right or even a viable approach for every user or use-case.

- ▶ A +ve take: on the other hand,
 - ▶ related people and artefacts should be valued (cf. US-RSE [12]),
 - ▶ community is important (cf. ECRYPT); tools like this help foster the community,
 - ▶ maturity of a research field is reflected (to some extent) in available infrastructure,
 - ▶ scale and reproducibility (e.g., wrt. ML-based SCA) clearly demand automation,
 - ▶ lots of interesting opportunities for impact,
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 - ▶ lots of interesting opportunities for impact,
- so the ideas more so than the tools seem of value, and (arguably) hint at open challenges, e.g.,
- ▶ usability:
 - ▶ what does a CI-like “badge” mean for leakage evaluation?
 - ▶ how to usefully communicate TVLA-like output into development cycles?
 - ▶ ...
 - ▶ performance:
 - ▶ what do genuinely efficient on-disk and in-memory data set formats look like?
 - ▶ ...

Questions?

References

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- [4] URL: <https://github.com/Riscure/J1sca> (see pp. 14, 15).
- [5] URL: <https://github.com/eshard/scared> (see pp. 14, 15).
- [6] URL: <https://www.dpacontest.org> (see pp. 14, 15).
- [7] URL: <https://github.com/ANSSI-FR/ASCAD> (see pp. 14, 15).
- [8] URL: <https://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html> (see p. 16).
- [9] URL: <https://github.com/sca-research/GILES> (see pp. 24, 25).
- [10] URL: <https://www.ni.com/en-gb/shop/software/products/labview.html> (see pp. 26–30).
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