


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**UCL**

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**Université  
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de Louvain**

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# Getting the Most Out of Leakage Detection

## Statistical tools and measurement setups hand in hand

COSADE 2017 – APRIL 14, 2017  
SESSION 7 : SIDE-CHANNEL TOOLS

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*UCL CRYPTO GROUP*



# Motivation

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- SCA evaluations are complex and expensive
- So, how can we reduce evaluation time?
  - Optimizing the distinguishers
    - Perhaps the hottest topic in the SCA community
  - Detecting rather than exploiting leakages
    - Cool guys are using  $t$ -test based tools



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  - Optimizing the distinguishers
    - Perhaps the hottest topic in the SCA community
  - Detecting rather than exploiting leakages
    - Cool guys are using *t*-test based tools
  - Obtaining good measurements
    - Mostly disregarded by academia
    - But, shall we not care about it?



# Our goals

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- Highlighting the impact of measurement setups to ease the detection of leakages
  - with tools available in almost any electronics retailer
  - sophisticated bespoke tools are out of scope
- Discussing about the effectiveness of state-of-the-art *t*-test based leakage detection tools
  - fair comparison using the same measurement setup
- Ultimate goal: combine the best of two worlds
  - illustrated in a highly noisy case study



# $t$ -test based leakage detection

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  - typically, fixed vs. random (non-specific)
  - more recently, fixed vs. fixed (improved signal)



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- Estimate sample mean and variance in a univariate fashion
  - traces must be accordingly preprocessed to detect higher-order leakages
- Compute *t*-test statistic for each time sample

$$t = \frac{\mu(\mathcal{T}_0) - \mu(\mathcal{T}_1)}{\sqrt{\frac{\sigma^2(\mathcal{T}_0)}{|\mathcal{T}_0|} + \frac{\sigma^2(\mathcal{T}_1)}{|\mathcal{T}_1|}}},$$



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
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- Test fails if at any time point  $|t| \geq 4.5 \rightarrow$  i.e., leakage detected



# Setups


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# Setups


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*Setup 1*




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


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
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*Setup 4*




# Setups



# Case studies

- First-order threshold implementation of PRESENT


- 3-share Boolean masking
  - secure against first-order SCAs
  - even in the presence of glitches
- Negligible algorithmic noise
  - fully serialized architecture
  - small combinatorial circuits
  - random masks are externally provided
- Design clocked @3MHz
  - so, no windowing effect



# Case studies


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- Gaussian noise engine

- FPGA-dedicated design by Güneysu et al.
- Configuring unused LUTs
  - $r$  cycling rings: noise variance
  - $s$  LUTs per ring: noise amplitude
  - our design:  $r=16$ ,  $s=100$
- PRNG implemented as a LFSR




# Comparing setups

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
- Based on the fixed vs. random  $t$ -test
- Analysis up to third-orders
- Full control over the implementation
  - input data can be reproduced for each setup
- 1M traces recorded in a low noise regime
  - negligible algorithmic noise of target design
    - noise engine is not implemented yet
  - ultra-low-noise design of SAKURA-G board




# Comparing setups – Setup 1




(a) Sample trace



(b) first-order




(c) second-order




(d) third-order




# Comparing setups – *Setup 2*




(a) Sample trace



(b) first-order




(c) second-order




(d) third-order




# Comparing setups – Setup 3




(a) Sample trace



(b) first-order




(c) second-order




(d) third-order




# Comparing setups – Setup 4




(a) Sample trace



(b) first-order



(c) second-order




(d) third-order




# Comparing setups – *Wrapping up*

- Second-order leakages: not detected
  - due to the register-oriented architecture
  - *Setup 1* is the closest to detection
    - noise introduced by the additional hardware?



- Third-order leakages: not detected by *Setup 1*
  - due to the low peak-to-peak amplitude
  - yet, is  $|t| \geq 4.5$  a good criteria?
    - clear pattern in the plots of *Setup 1*



# Comparing distinguishers


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- Same methodology
- Same target
- Just, different distinguisher: fixed vs. fixed
  - goal: evaluate the improvement in convergence speed
- Assuming a powerful adversary
  - full knowledge of the target design and its implementation
  - so, inputs are carefully selected
    - e.g., to maximize HD differences
  - yet, this is not a major requirement for fixed vs. fixed to work




# Comparing distinguishers – *Results*

- Second-order leakages: detected
  - *Setup 1*: still unsuccessful
  - significant improvements for the other setups
- Third-order leakages: pinpointed with higher confidence
  - *Setup 1*: becomes successful
  - *Setups 2 and 3*: reduction by a factor  $\approx 4$  on the number of traces



(a) second-order



(b) third-order



# Consolidating results




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- Fact: fixed vs. fixed enables leakage detection with reduced data complexity
- Question: is it because of a greater signal or just a reduction in noise?
- Solution: scenario with hard-to-filter noise
  - if so, all gains will be due to an improved signal
  - remember the Gaussian noise engine?
    - noise synchronized with the crypto core
- 100M measurements recorded with *Setup 4*






# Consolidating results – Comparison

*Fixed vs. random t-test based*




*Fixed vs. fixed t-test based*



# Consolidating results - *Wrapping up*

- Fixed vs. random: no leakage detected
  - Different (fixed) plaintexts tested: yet, same results
- Fixed vs. fixed: second-order leakages detected
  - results are inline with theory
    - low-order moments are more informative in high noise settings
  - Indeed, 60M measurements are enough



- We answered the question:
  - increasing the signal (significantly) reduces the data complexity to detect higher-order leakages



# Final message

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- Take care of your measurement setup
  - small tweaks can make a huge difference
- Use the best distinguisher you can
  - for reduced acquisition time and storage requirements
    - critical factor when multi-million traces need to be recorded and then analyzed
  - a plus when the measurement hardware cannot help you
    - e.g., by increasing the signal in the presence of hard-to-filter noise



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**THANK YOU!**

**DO YOU HAVE QUESTIONS?**

