



# SafeDRP: Yet Another Way Toward Power-Equalized Designs in FPGA

Maik Ender, Alexander Wild, and Amir Moradi

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13.04.17

hg | EMSEC


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  - Lastly published GliFreD has high resource consumption of FF
- Idea: less FF while addressing all pitfalls


# Field Programmable Gate Array Concept



Source: *Electronics* 2015; Optimally Fortifying Logic Reliability through Criticality Ranking; <http://www.mdpi.com/2079-9292/4/1/150/htm>

# Field Programmable Gate Array


## Concept



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## Dual-Rail Logic


- Differential encoding
- Valid values: 10 or 01
- No Inverter






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
## Precharge Logic

- Alternates between Precharge and logic value
- Precharge and evaluation phase




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
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
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
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
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
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
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- Transition based on the arriving signals




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
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- Undesired transition




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
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## Routing


- Different capacities



# Idea of Our Advanced Hiding Schemes




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




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


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
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
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
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
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


- Early evaluation, glitches  
*active signal*
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
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
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*one after another*  
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


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


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
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
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
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*active signal one after another*  
I/O-Handling  
*use FF/latches*  
Consider routing

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


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
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
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
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
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Generate by Mixed-Mode Clock Manager (MMCM)




- Early evaluation, glitches  
*active signal one after another*
- I/O-Handling  
*use FF/latches*
- Consider routing duplication
  1. Place&Route




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*active signal one after another*
- I/O-Handling  
*use FF/latches*
- Consider routing *duplication*
  1. Place&Route
  2. Clone





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*use FF/latches*
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  1. Place&Route
  2. Clone
  3. Place clone



- Early evaluation, glitches  
*active signal one after another*
  - I/O-Handling  
*use FF/latches*
  - Consider routing *duplication*
    1. Place&Route
    2. Clone
    3. Place clone
    4. Invert
- Equal routing

# Side-Channel Evaluation Measurement Setup

Round based AES-128



Xilinx Kintex-7 on Sakura-X

Source Sakura in Specification Guide and <http://satoh.cs.uec.ac.jp/SAKURA/hardware/SAKURA-X.html>

Source Picoscope: <https://www.picotech.com/oscilloscope/6407/high-speed-digitizer>

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
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# Side-Channel Evaluation Measurement Setup

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10,000,000 Traces



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	SafeDRP	
	Doubled	Single
LUTs	3712	1856
Register	1276	638
Slices	1296	648
Latency <sup>a</sup>	11	
Pipeline	0	
Throughput <sup>b</sup>	116	

<sup>a</sup> clock cycles

<sup>b</sup> MBit/s @ 10 MHz

- [17] A. Moradi and A. Wild. Assessment of Hiding the Higher-Order Leakages in Hardware - what are the achievements versus overheads? In CHES 2015
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	Doubled	Single	Doubled	Single	Doubled	Single	
LUTs	3712	1856	3466	1733	3466	1733	1262
Register	1276	638	11360	5680	22080	11040	256
Slices	1296	648	11638	5819	15502	7751	392
Latency <sup>a</sup>	11		154		308		11
Pipeline	0		14		14		0
Throughput <sup>b</sup>	116		116		58		116

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- Reduced latency but GliFreD might reach a higher max. frequency

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## Methods

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  - Amount of exploitable information

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  - Dependency of the power traces to the plaintext
- Information-Theoretic mutual information
  - Amount of exploitable information
- Correlation power analysis (CPA)
  - Common key recovery attack
  - HW and bit model of intermediate S-Box state




## Methods

- Signal-to-Noise ratio  $SNR = \frac{\downarrow var(Signal)}{var(Noise)}$ 
  - Dependency of the power traces to the plaintext
- Information-Theoretic mutual information
  - Amount of exploitable information
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- Moments-Correlating DPA (MC-DPA)
  - Key recovery attack w/o particular power model

## Methods

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  - Key recovery attack w/o particular power model
- Semi-fix vs. random Welch's t-test
  - Overview of the existing detectable leakage

# Side-Channel Evaluation Profiles





## Profile 1 (SafeDRP)

Duplication ±

Active & Pre 



# Side-Channel Evaluation Profiles



## Profile 1 (SafeDRP)

Duplication  $\pm$

✓

Active & Pre 

✓

## Profile 2


Duplication  $\pm$

✗


Active & Pre 

✓


# Side-Channel Evaluation Profiles



Profile 1 (SafeDRP)	
Duplication ±	Active & Pre
✓	✓



Profile 2	
Duplication ±	Active & Pre
✗	✓




Profile 3 (Unprotected)	
Duplication ±	Active & Pre
✗	✗


# Side-Channel Evaluation

## SNR


$$SNR = \frac{\downarrow var(Signal)}{var(Noise)}$$



Profile 1 (SafeDRP)	
Duplication $\pm$	Active & Pre
✓	✓



Profile 2	
Duplication $\pm$	Active & Pre
✗	✓




Profile 3 (Unprotected)	
Duplication $\pm$	Active & Pre
✗	✗

# Side-Channel Evaluation

## SNR

$$SNR = \frac{\downarrow var(Signal)}{var(Noise)}$$



### Profile 1 (SafeDRP)

Duplication  $\pm$

Active & Pre

✓

✓

Decrease Factor 2

0.03784

$\frac{0.03784}{0.00018} \approx 214$

### Profile 3 (Unprotected)

Duplication  $\pm$

Active & Pre


✗

✗

# Side-Channel Evaluation

## SNR

$$SNR = \frac{\downarrow var(Signal)}{var(Noise)}$$



### Profile 1 (SafeDRP)

Duplication ±	Active & Pre
✓	✓

Decrease Factor 2

$$\frac{0.03784}{0.00018} \approx 214$$


Decrease Factor 3


$$\frac{0.05523}{0.00018} \approx 313$$





# Side-Channel Evaluation


## IT (Mutual Information)




Profile 1 (SafeDRP)	
Duplication ±	Active & Pre 
✓	✓




Profile 2	
Duplication ±	Active & Pre 
✗	✓




Profile 3 (Unprotected)	
Duplication ±	Active & Pre 
✗	✗

# Side-Channel Evaluation

## IT (Mutual Information)




Profile 1 (SafeDRP)	
Duplication ±	Active & Pre
✓	✓




Decrease Factor 2

$$\frac{0.0267}{0.00015} \approx 183$$




Profile 3 (Unprotected)	
Duplication ±	Active & Pre
✗	✗

# Side-Channel Evaluation IT (Mutual Information)




## Profile 1 (SafeDRP)

Duplication $\pm$	Active & Pre
✓	✓



Decrease Factor 2

$$\frac{0.0267}{0.00015} \approx 183$$




Decrease Factor 3

$$\frac{0.0386}{0.00015} \approx 265$$

# Side-Channel Evaluation

## CPA HW S-Box Intermediate Model




Profile 1 (SafeDRP)	
Duplication $\pm$	Active & Pre
✓	✓

Profile 2	
Duplication $\pm$	Active & Pre
✗	✓

Profile 3 (Unprotected)	
Duplication $\pm$	Active & Pre
✗	✗

# Side-Channel Evaluation

## CPA HW S-Box Intermediate Model




### Profile 1 (SafeDRP)

Duplication  $\pm$

Active & Pre

✓

✓




### Profile 2

Duplication  $\pm$

Active & Pre

✗

✓



### Profile 3 (Unprotected)

Duplication  $\pm$

Active & Pre


✗

✗


# Side-Channel Evaluation

## CPA HW S-Box Intermediate Model

$$n \approx \frac{28}{\rho^2}$$




Rule of Thumb (RoT):  
2,184,700 *Traces*  
to recover the key



Decrease  
Factor 29

Profile 2	
Duplication ±	Active & Pre 🔔
x	✓




Profile 3 (Unprotected)	
Duplication ±	Active & Pre 🔔
x	x


# Side-Channel Evaluation

## CPA HW S-Box Intermediate Model

$$n \approx \frac{28}{\rho^2}$$




Rule of Thumb (RoT):  
2,184,700 *Traces*  
to recover the key



Decrease  
Factor 29

$$\text{RoT: } \left(\frac{\rho_2}{\rho_1}\right)^2 \approx 881$$



### Profile 3 (Unprotected)


Duplication ±	Active & Pre
x	x




# Side-Channel Evaluation

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


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Decrease  
Factor 29

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


HW Model  
does not fit




# Side-Channel Evaluation

## MC-DPA




### Profile 1 (SafeDRP)

Duplication $\pm$	Active & Pre
✓	✓



### Profile 2

Duplication $\pm$	Active & Pre
x	✓




### Profile 3 (Unprotected)


Duplication $\pm$	Active & Pre
x	x

# Side-Channel Evaluation

## MC-DPA



Rule of Thumb (RoT):  
244,000 *Traces*  
to recover the key




### Profile 2

Duplication  $\pm$

Active & Pre

x

✓



### Profile 3 (Unprotected)

Duplication  $\pm$


Active & Pre

x


x

# Side-Channel Evaluation

## MC-DPA




Rule of Thumb (RoT):  
244,000 *Traces*  
to recover the key



Decrease  
Factor 18

$$\text{RoT: } \left(\frac{\rho_2}{\rho_1}\right)^2 \approx 327$$



### Profile 3 (Unprotected)

Duplication ±


Active & Pre 

x


x

# Side-Channel Evaluation

## MC-DPA




Rule of Thumb (RoT):  
244,000 *Traces*  
to recover the key



Decrease  
Factor 18


$$\text{RoT: } \left(\frac{\rho_2}{\rho_1}\right)^2 \approx 327$$



Decrease  
Factor 21

$$\text{RoT: } \left(\frac{\rho_3}{\rho_1}\right)^2 \approx 468$$

## Welch's T-Test



- Semi-fix vs. random
- 5<sup>th</sup> round first 64 bit zero [1]
- 1,000,000 Traces
- Leakage only in 5<sup>th</sup> round

[1] Evaluating the Duplication of Dual-Rail Precharge Logics on FPGAs; Alexander Wild, Amir Moradi, Tim Güneysu; COSDAE 2015

- Improved DRP scheme
  - Reduce the FF utilization
  - Complex control logic
- Addressing all pitfalls
  - Avoiding glitches
  - Preventing early evaluation
  - Mitigate the imbalanced routings
- Combination [2] with sound masking scheme for a practical secure implementation

[2] A. Wild and A. Moradi; Assessment of Hiding the Higher-Order Leakage in Hardware – what are the achievements versus overheads?; CHES 2015

- Improved DRP scheme
  - Reduce the FF utilization
  - Complex control logic
- Addressing all pitfalls
  - Avoiding glitches
  - Preventing early evaluation
  - Mitigate the imbalanced routings
- Combination [2] with sound masking scheme for a practical secure implementation

Thank you!

